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Chapter 4
An Economic Approach to Setting
Retirement Saving Goals
B. Douglas Bernheim, Lorenzo Forni, Jagadeesh
Gokhale, and Laurence J. Kotlikoff
Effective retirement planning begins with the establishment of appropriate
goals for saving. If these goals are set too high, households may sacrifice
present wellbeing excessively to sustain future high living standards. If these
goals are set too low, households may indulge immediate desires at the
expense of future living standards. Thus having inappropriate retirement
saving goals may produce undesired and perhaps abrupt changes in living
standards. By contrast, with appropriate saving goals, households will tend
to ‘‘smooth’’ consumption, thereby avoiding undesirable changes.
Consumption smoothing is a fundamental prediction and prescription of
modern economic theory. This theory rests on a life cycle model of behavior
which posits that each household is motivated by a sense of wellbeing that
depends both on current satisfaction and on expectations of future satisfac-
tion. The principle of consumption smoothing follows directly from the law
of diminishing returns: individuals are well advised to reallocate dollars
from time periods in which they are consuming a great deal (and in which
incremental dollars therefore add relatively little to wellbeing), to periods in
which they are consuming relatively little (and in which incremental dollars
are therefore particularly valuable). To economists, consumption smooth-
ing is the central purpose of saving.
Traditional financial planning methods are inconsistent with, and in
some instances antithetical to, standard economic doctrine. The hallmark
of these methods is the establishment of an asset target derived from either
income or spending objectives. Unfortunately, such objectives are not typ-
ically derived from the principles of consumption smoothing. As a result,
traditional financial plans frequently guarantee dramatic swings in spend-
ing as households age.
Despite this fundamental shortcoming, virtually every financial planning
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software package available today embodies the traditional targeted-saving
approach. In some instances, users are asked to specify future spending or
income targets with reference to current spending or income, but this is a
far cry from consumption smoothing. To illustrate, imagine a household
attempting to set a spending target. If it selects its target with reference to
current spending, and if its current spending is not sustainable over its
planning horizon, then it will be told to reduce its current consumption and
save more than is required for consumption smoothing. Were the house-
hold to follow this prescription, it would experience an undesired surge in
spending at retirement. To put it differently, the household would sacrifice
too much when young so as to benefit from a higher living standard after
retirement. Conversely, if the household’s spending is currently less than it
can sustain over its planning horizon, it will be told to increase its current
consumption and save less than is required for consumption smoothing.
Were the household to follow this prescription, it could experience a sud-
den and undesired drop in living standard at retirement. In other words, the
household would deprive itself of a more satisfactory retirement by consum-
ing excessively in earlier years. Setting future income targets with reference
to current income is even less likely to generate a sensible path for consump-
tion. A household’s current income may fluctuate because of one-time
bonuses, temporary unemployment, enrollment in higher education, child-
care, and a variety of other factors.
By assuming a spending or income target, traditional financial planning
techniques implicitly require households to perform the most complex and
important planning tasks by themselves. This is because setting a target
consistent with consumption smoothing requires a household to consider a
wide range of factors including current and future household composition,
the age and likely lifespan of each spouse, current and future labor earn-
ings, special expenditures and receipts, social security benefits, current net
worth, income from taxable and nontaxable assets, current and future con-
tributions to retirement accounts, current and future federal and state
taxes, asset returns, current housing and future housing plans, and borrow-
ing constraints. Each of these factors interacts with others, and none can be
evaluated appropriately in isolation. Consider, for example, future housing
plans. Downsizing or upsizing a home alters the future path of housing
expenses, mortgage and property tax deductions, saving, capital income,
and federal and state taxes. To determine the impact of housing choices on
sustainable living standards, one must solve a complex dynamic program-
ming problem. Many individuals will not know how to see this problem
when selecting a target for future spending or income.
Mindful of these overwhelming complexities, traditional financial plan-
ners often advise households to set their targets using simple rules of
thumb, such as π≠ percent income replacement. Unfortunately these seem-
ingly straightforward recommendations are often highly inappropriate,
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and many households tend to adopt them uncritically, deferring to a plan-
ner’s expertise. In following such advice, a household smoothes its saving,
rather than its consumption, so its living standard could potentially fluctu-
ate wildly from year to year.
The shortcomings of existing financial planning techniques have
prompted the development of an economics-inspired financial planning
software package known as Economic Security Planner, or ESPlanner.∞ Its
underlying algorithm determines a household’s maximum sustainable liv-
ing standard as well as the rate of saving and level of life insurance holdings
required to preserve that living standard through time. In order to elucidate
how the model works, we first describe its logic and compare our economic
approach to financial planning, as embodied in ESPlanner, with a conven-
tional approach as embodied in Quicken Financial Planner. Finally, we ex-
pand on Bernheim et al. (≤≠≠≠) by using the software to determine appro-
priate saving goals for typical Americans approaching retirement.
An Economic Approach to Financial Planning
It is important to realize that the principle of consumption smoothing ap-
plies to the individual, rather than to a household. That is, while individuals
may smooth consumption, household expenditures will shift with the arrival
and departure of family members. Since larger households benefit from
economies of scale with respect to shared expenses, consumption smooth-
ing on the part of each individual does not require household expenditures
to increase proportionately with household size. Accordingly, our software
smoothes a measure of the household’s living standard, which depends on
consumption per adult-equivalent (based on children’s ages), accounting
for the economies of scale that are associated with family size.
It is also important to realize that the principle of consumption smooth-
ing does not apply to all household expenditures. Exceptions occur when
particular expenditures are either nonrecurring or difficult to modify. Ex-
amples might include college tuition and housing expenses (down pay-
ments, mortgages, and property taxes). ESPlanner deducts these special
expenditures directly from income ‘‘off the top,’’ and smoothes the liv-
ing standard derived from all remaining expenditures. Application of the
consumption-smoothing dictum may also be limited by institutional con-
straints. For example, lenders are often reluctant to extend unsecured
credit. To smooth consumption, households with rapidly growing income
must borrow against future receipts. If they cannot, then their consumption
may rise (and even fluctuate) with income. Accordingly, our model smooths
consumption to the greatest extent possible, subject to the limitations on
each household’s ability to borrow.
The principle of consumption smoothing applies to decisions about life
insurance, as well as to decisions about saving. Households use life insur-
80 Bernheim, Forni, Gokhale, and Kotlikoff
ance to moderate the impact of a family member’s death on the survivors’
living standards. Moreover, decisions about life insurance and saving are
inextricably linked. Current budgeted expenses must include an adequate
allotment for life insurance premiums, and saving must be sufficient to
cover future premiums. Accordingly, in deriving a financial plan, our model
solves simultaneously for the ideal levels of saving and life insurance. It
thereby ensures that survivors can sustain the same living standard as the
intact family, irrespective of which family members die or when they die.
Naturally, many things can change following the death of a spouse. The
survivor may move to a new house, change jobs, or return to work. He or
she may incur additional child care expenses, or revisit plans to send the
child to an expensive private university. To accommodate these important
possibilities, ESPlanner encourages contingent planning. In particular, each
spouse may specify different levels of earnings, special expenditures, and
tax-favored retirement contributions in the event that he or she is widowed.
Changes in contingent plans often have substantial effects on appropriate
life insurance holdings.
Required Information
To apply the principle of consumption smoothing while accounting for the
various considerations mentioned above, our software requires several types
of inputs:
Demographics. ESPlanner solicits the birth dates of the household head
and spouse as well as the birth years of children under age ∞Ω. Children are
assumed ordinarily to remain in the household through age ∞∫. Each spouse
must also specify a maximum length of life, which refers to the limit of the
individual’s planning horizon (note that this differs from life expectancy).
The program smoothes consumption over this horizon, thereby protecting
household members from the possibility that they might outlive their re-
sources. Users also identify their state of residence, which is used to deter-
mine applicable tax rates.
Standard of living index. Economic theory allows for the possibility that a
household might prefer either a rising or falling standard of living, over one
that is constant over time. A household might also prefer to change its level
of consumption upon retirement because it anticipates increased spending
on activities that are complementary with leisure, and/or reduced spend-
ing on activities that are substitutes for leisure. Our model accommodates
these possibilities by permitting users to specify how they would like their
living standard to change through time. By adjusting a living standard index
from its default value of ∞≠≠ in any year or collection of years, a user can
customize the shape of his living standard profile (for example, one can
specify that the living standard is to grow at the rate of one percent per year
or should decline by ∞≠ percent at retirement). The model then determines
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the highest current living standard, as well as the associated financial plan,
consistent with the characteristics specified by the user.
Labor earnings. For each spouse, software solicits current labor earnings as
well as the amount that he or she would expect to earn if widowed (con-
tingent earnings). Separate information is collected on employee wages
and self-employment income. It is necessary to distinguish between these
forms of income because they are treated differently under the payroll tax.
Each spouse also specifies a retirement date and a growth path for labor
earnings up to retirement, as well as a (potentially different) retirement
date and earnings growth path that would apply in the event he or she were
widowed.≤
Special expenditures and receipts. Our model also provides users with the
ability to specify nonrecurring (or briefly recurring) expenditures and re-
ceipts. Each special expenditure must be designated as either deductible or
nondeductible and each special receipt is described as either taxable or
nontaxable. For each briefly recurring item (such as college tuition), the
user provides a start and an end date. Each spouse specifies special expen-
ditures and receipts that would apply in the event that he or she were
widowed.≥
Estate plans. In many instances, people may wish to leave a bequest in
excess of the amount required to sustain the surviving spouse’s living stan-
dard through his or her maximum lifespan, and to sustain the living stan-
dard of children through age ∞∫. Accordingly, our model permits users to
specify special (incremental) bequests, including resources to defray death-
related expenses such as funerals.
Net worth. Information on net worth is essential for accurate financial
planning, and accordingly, our software separately solicits data on non-tax-
favored and tax-favored assets. In the case of tax-favored accounts, each
spouse’s holdings are detailed, as well as a) the last year he or she will con-
tribute to the account, b) the first year he or she will start withdrawing from
the account, and c) the year he or she will stop withdrawing from the ac-
count. Users may select one of two options for withdrawing tax-favored bal-
ances: uniform withdrawals, or the smallest legally permissable withdrawals.
Saving. An individual who attaches a high value to liquidity may be reluc-
tant to tie up too much of net worth in tax-favored accounts. Conversely,
someone less concerned about liquidity may wish to maximize tax-favored
holdings. Accordingly, the model permits the user to determine the com-
position of saving by indicating current non-tax-favored saving, as well as
current and intended future employee and employer contributions to tax-
favored accounts (for both joint-survivor and widowed contingencies).
Housing. For most Americans, housing represents both a major expense
and an important store of wealth. Accordingly, the softward solicits in-
formation on both primary and secondary (vacation) homes. Homeowners
estimate current market value, provide information on loans, and detail
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current expenses, while renters list housing-related expenses. Users also
describe future plans concerning refinancing and moves (including upsiz-
ing, downsizing, liquidation of second homes, shifts between homeowner
and renter status, and so forth).
Pensions. Accurate financial planning requires detailed information on
work-related retirement benefits. The model treats defined contribution
(DC) accounts as tax-favored assets. Each spouse separately supplies infor-
mation on defined benefit (DB) pensions, including the year or years in
which benefits will be received, projected amounts (either lump-sum, an-
nual, or both), whether the benefits are indexed to inflation, and the level
of benefits received by a survivor.
Social security. Social security remains an important source of retirement
and disability income for many Americans. Our software uses past and fu-
ture earnings in covered employment to estimate benefits for those who are
not yet collecting benefits. Its benefit calculator takes into account eligibility
rules, early retirement reductions, delayed retirement credits, benefit re-
computations, the phased increase in the normal retirement age, the earn-
ings test between ages ∏≤ and ∏∑, family benefit maximums, the wage index-
ation of Average Indexed Monthly Earnings, and the price indexation of
benefits once they are received. All these elements are needed to deter-
mine anticipated retirement, spousal, mother, father, child, and widow(er)
benefits.
Economic assumptions. Meaningful financial planning requires a variety of
assumptions about the economic environment. Our model supplies default
values for all critical economic parameters including the inflation rate,
nominal rates of return on tax-favored and non-tax-favored assets, the de-
gree of economies in shared living, child-adult equivalency factors, the max-
imum amount the household can borrow (apart from mortgages), future
rules governing payroll taxes and social security benefits, and the share of
total non-tax-favored capital income accruing in the form of long-term cap-
ital gains. Users are permitted to substitute alternative values for these
parameters.
Taxes. Meaningful financial planning requires proper recognition of tax
liabilities. Accordingly, ESPlanner calculates federal and state income and
payroll taxes for each future year, for each survival state (both spouses alive
and husband deceased, husband deceased and wife alive). The model also
computes estimated federal income taxes reflecting deductions and exemp-
tions, the partial taxation of social security benefits, the earned income tax
credit, the child tax credit, the phase-out of deductions and exemptions at
higher income levels, the indexation of tax brackets to the consumer price
index, and the preferential taxation of long-term capital gains. In comput-
ing deductions, the household is assumed to itemize if eligible expenses
exceed the standard deduction (principally mortgage payments, property
taxes, state income taxes, spousal support payments, charitable contribu-
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tions, and other designated special expenses). Estimated state income tax
liabilities (for each year and for each survival state) reflect state of resi-
dence, as well as the specific exemptions, deductions, and rate structure
appropriate for that state. In computing both federal and state taxable
income, the program deducts, as appropriate, contributions to tax-favored
accounts and includes, as appropriate, withdrawals from these accounts.
Finally, the determination of social security payroll taxes accounts for the
ceiling on covered earnings, which applies to the portions of the tax that
finance retirement and disability benefits, but not to the portion that fi-
nances Medicare.
Model Recommendations
ESPlanner’s principal outputs are recommended time paths for consump-
tion expenditure, non-tax-favored saving, and term-life insurance holdings
(for each spouse individually, in the case of married couples). All outputs
are displayed in current-year (i.e., real) dollars, and recommendations for
saving and life insurance are compared with current choices. Although the
derivation of the recommended financial plan involves a complex dynamic
programming algorithm, reports and recommendations are easily inter-
preted. Moreover, from an inspection of the reports, it is readily evident that
the program achieves the objective of consumption smoothing, thereby
identifying the highest sustainable living standard for the household.
In this context, ‘‘consumption’’ refers to all spending over and above ‘‘off-
the-top’’ items, including housing expenses, special expenditures, life insur-
ance premiums, taxes, and net contributions to tax-favored accounts. Rec-
ommended consumption expenditures vary from year to year when the
household’s composition changes, and when the household moves into or
out of a liquidity-constrained period. Naturally, recommended household
consumption may also change over time when the user has expressed a
preference for a rising or declining living standard (as discussed above).
Recommended taxable saving in any year equals the household’s total in-
come (non-asset plus asset income) minus the sum of (a) recommended
spending on consumption and insurance premiums, (b) specified spending
on housing and special expenditures, (c) taxes, and (d) net contributions to
tax-favored accounts (contributions less withdrawals).
Recommended levels for term life insurance are either positive or zero.∂ If
recommended term insurance in a particular year is positive for a particular
potential decedent (the household head or, if married, the spouse), and if
the decedent dies at the end of that year, the surviving household will have
precisely the same living standard as the household would have had absent
the decedent’s premature death. If the potential decedent’s recommended
insurance in a particular year is zero, the surviving household will have the
same or higher living standard if the decedent dies in that year. These
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statements are, of course, conditional on complete execution of the recom-
mended financial plan, as well as on the correctness of underlying eco-
nomic assumptions and information concerning future income, current
asset holdings, and special expenditures.
Illustrating the ESPlanner Results
To indicate how the model works we introduce Al and Peg, a married cou-
ple, who decide to formulate a detailed financial plan. In the year ≤≠≠≠, Al is
∑≠ years old and Peg is ∂∑, and they reside in the state of New York with two
children, Kelly, age ∞∑, and Bud, age ∞≥. Al and Peg each plan to work
through age ∏∑, earning respectively $≤∑,≠≠≠ and $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ each year (these
figures all all others mentioned in this illustration refer to year-≤≠≠≠ dol-
lars). If Al were to die, Peg would still earn $∞≠≠,≠≠≠, but if Peg were to die,
Al would switch jobs and expect to earn $∂≠,≠≠≠. The couple plan to send
each child to college for four years, and to spend $≥≠,≠≠≠ per child per year
on tuition. Al and Peg wish to allocate $∑,≠≠≠ each for their funerals. Antic-
ipating a desire to pursue costly leisure activities during retirement, they
decide to specify a ∞≠ percent increase in living standard upon Al’s retire-
ment. They currently own and live in their home. The house has a market
value of $≥≠≠,≠≠≠. Annual property taxes are $∑,≠≠≠, annual homeowners’
insurance is $π∑≠, and annual maintenance averages $∞,∑≠≠. Al and Peg
have ≤∑ years remaining on a ≥≠-year mortgage; their current mortgage
balance stands at $≤≠≠,≠≠≠, and they pay $≤,≤≠≠ each month. They plan to
sell their home when Al is π≠ years old and rent an apartment for $≤,≠≠≠ per
month (in today’s dollars). Each spouse works in social security-covered
employment and the past covered earnings of each spouse grew smoothly to
their current values. The couple wants to set aside $∞≠≠,≠≠≠ by ≤≠≤≠ (when
Al is age π≠ and Peg is age ∏∑) as an emergency fund for medical expenses. If
only one spouse is alive in ≤≠≤≠, they plant to put only $∑≠,≠≠≠ aside.
Table ∞ shows our model’s annual non-tax-favored saving, consumption,
and life insurance recommendations. The couple’s future spending, includ-
ing consumption, housing expenses, special expenditures, life insurance
premiums, and funeral expenses is tracked in Table ≤, while Table ≥ is a
balance sheet—it tracks the household’s non-tax-favored assets. Al and
Peg’s income over time is depicted in Table ∂, where non-asset income
refers to labor income, pension income, and social security benefits. These
first four tables all assume that both spouses live to their assumed maximum
life expectancy.∑
Consider first the consumption recommendations in Table ∞. Recom-
mended discretionary expenditures equal $∑∫,≠∞∫ through ≤≠≠∂, the year
Kelly goes to college, at which point consumption falls to $∂Ω,∏≤≤. It drops
again to $∂≠,∂∫∏ in ≤≠≠∏ when Bud goes to college. Consumption remains at
this level until ≤≠∞∑ when Al reaches age ∏∑. At this point, consumption rises
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Table 1. Annual Recommendations for Saving, Consumption, and Life Insurance
Year Al’s Age Peg’s Age
Non-
Tax-Favored
Saving ($) Consumption ($)
Al’s Life
Insurance ($)
Peg’s Life
Insurance ($)
≤≠≠≠ ∑≠ ∂∑ ∞,π∑∞ ∑∫,≠∞∫ ≠ ∂∏∫,∫∏∫
≤≠≠∞ ∑∞ ∂∏ ≤,≥Ω∑ ∑∫,≠∞∫ ≠ ∂∑≤,≥∂∑
≤≠≠≤ ∑≤ ∂π ≤,∑Ω∞ ∑∫,≠∞∫ ≠ ∂≥∞,∂∞≥
≤≠≠≥ ∑≥ ∂∫ ≥,≤≠∫ ∑∫,≠∞∫ ≠ ∂≠∫,≤π≤
≤≠≠∂ ∑∂ ∂Ω (∞∫,∞∑≥) ∂Ω,∏≤≤ ≠ ≥ππ,∏≠∑
≤≠≠∑ ∑∑ ∑≠ (∞π,ππ∑) ∂Ω,∏≤≤ ≠ ≥∂π,≤π∫
≤≠∞≠ ∏≠ ∑∑ ≤∞,Ω∫∞ ∂≠,∂∫∏ ≠ ∞∂∫,Ω∑≤
≤≠∞∑ ∏∑ ∏≠ ≤≥,∞≥∫ ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠≤≠ π≠ ∏∑ (∞≠π,∫Ω∫) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠≤∑ π∑ π≠ (∞∞,≤Ωπ) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠≥≠ ∫≠ π∑ (∞∞,∫≠∂) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠≥∑ ∫∑ ∫≠ (∞≤,≥≥∂) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠∂≠ Ω≠ ∫∑ (∞≤,∫∏≥) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠∂∑ Ω∑ Ω≠ (∞∫,∂∂∞) ∂∂,∑≥∂ ≠ ≠
≤≠∑≠ Ω∑ (≤≠,∞∏≤) ≤π,∫≥∂ ≠ ≠
Source: Authors’ calculations, based on hypothetical family characteristics for Al and Peg; see text.
by ∞≠ percent to $∂∂,∑≥∂ in accordance with Al’s and Peg’s desire to have a
∞≠ percent higher living standard in retirement. Finally, in ≤≠∂∏, when Al is
deceased, consumption falls to $≤π,∫≥∂, since then only Peg remains in the
household. Note that the ratio of consumption when Al and Peg are both
alive ($∂∂,∑≥∂) to the value when only Peg ($≤π,∫≥∂) is alive is ∞.∏. This
reflects our assumption that, with the addition of a second adult, spending
must increase by a factor of ∞.∏ (i.e. by ∏≠ percent) to preserve the same
living standard.
In contrast to the relatively smooth trajectory for the household’s living
standard, non-tax-favored saving patterns fluctuate widely. Saving is positive
until the children go to college, negative when they are in college, positive
after they leave college, and negative once Al and Peg are retired. Note that
Al’s and Peg’s non-tax-favored saving is largest immediately prior to Peg’s
retirement. This is what one would expect, since in their younger years Al
and Peg must pay for a mortgage and college tuition. After these obligations
are met, Al and Peg can concentrate on saving for retirement. The largest
increment to their liquid assets occurs when they sell their home. Their
highest rate of dissaving occurs when they make special expenditures. Like-
wise, as indicated in Table ≤, total spending also fluctuates more than discre-
tionary spending due to changes in special expenditures, housing costs, life
insurance premiums, and funeral expenses.
Our model recommends that the couple initially obtain $∂∏∫,∫∏∫ in in-
surance on Peg’s life. Over time, Peg’s recommended life insurance declines
and reaches zero at age ∏∂. For Al, recommended life insurance is zero,
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since even without life insurance, Peg and the children would enjoy a higher
material living standard were Al to die than were he to live.
The balance sheet in Table ≥ proves one can readily see that our model’s
consumption recommendations are affordable. This balance sheet tracks
the evolution of the couple’s non-tax-favored net worth, which in turn trans-
lates into recommended non-tax-favored saving. This flow then equals the
difference between the household’s income, detailed in Table ∂, and the
sum of its net contribution to retirement (non-tax-favored) accounts, total
spending, and taxes. Note that household net worth is never negative. This
implies that the plan is feasible. Note also that net worth is zero when Peg
reaches her maximum lifespan, indicating that there are no unused re-
sources. Since it is infeasible to increase consumption in any year without
reducing it in another year, the program has identified the highest con-
sumption profile with the characteristics that the couple desires (an un-
changing living standard, except for a ∞≠ percent rise at retirement).
One can also verify that a surviving spouse could maintain his or her accus-
tomed living standard in the event of widowhood. For instance, Table ∑ de-
tails Al’s recommended spending assuming that Peg dies at age ∂∏, one year
after adopting the plan. Recommended consumption for Al declines when
the children leave the household and then rises by ∞≠ percent when Al
reaches age ∏∑. Note that when Al is living by himself, the ratio of his con-
sumption in any year to the corresponding value in Table ≤ is ∞ divided by
∞.∏. Given our assumption concerning the magnitude of household scale
economies, this implies that Al is enjoying the same living standard as a sur-
vivor that he would have enjoyed had Peg not died. Similarly the balance
sheet in Table ∏ shows that consumption recommendations are affordable
for Al if Peg dies. This follows from the fact that Al never goes into debt. Note
also that net worth is zero when Al reaches his maximum lifespan, implying
that there are no unused resources. It is therefore infeasible to increase con-
sumption in any year without reducing it in another year. Upon Peg’s death,
Al’s non tax-favored wealth is $∏≠∑,ΩΩ≤. This amount equals the couple’s
$∞∑∫,∏∂π in non tax-favored assets at the end of ≤≠≠∞ plus the $∂∑≤,≥∂∑ in
term insurance recommended for Peg in ≤≠≠∞, less the $∑≠≠≠ payment for
Peg’s funeral. Were the couple to purchase less insurance on Peg’s life, Al
would not be able to finance the same living standard as a survivor.
Limitations of This Approach
Although our model considers many key factors that enter into saving and
insurance decisions, it is important to acknowledge that some relevant fac-
tors are omitted. Two specific omissions merit discussion. First, the software
does not take into account the uncertainty of future income or expendi-
tures on necessities such as noninsured health care costs. Users are required
to perform sensitivity analysis to understand the implications of uncertainty,
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examining a variety of alternative scenarios to assess their exposures and
vulnerabilities. Second, the software does not account for possible changes
in marital status, such as remarriage after a spouse’s death. To some extent,
the remarriage option may mitigate financial vulnerabilities associated with
the risk of a spouse’s death. There are, nevertheless, legitimate reasons to
ignore this possibility. Arguably, the choice of whether to remarry should
not be dictated by financial necessity. In addition, the economic wellbeing
of a remarried individual may be determined by his or her financial status
prior to remarriage, insofar as this affects bargaining power within the new
marriage (cf. Lundberg ∞ΩΩΩ). Finally, remarriage after a spouse’s death is
less common among older individuals.
Comparing the Economic Approach and the Traditional
Approach to Financial Planning
In prior research Gokhale et al. (∞ΩΩΩ) compared the economic approach,
embodied in the ESPlanner, with a more traditional approach, as embodied
in Quicken Financial Planner (QFP). Table π reports consumption, saving,
and life insurance recommendations for three households—a low-income,
young married couple with no children; a upper-income, middle-aged mar-
ried couple with two children; and a high-income, older married couple
with adult children.
In deriving financial plans with the Quicken Financial Planner software,
Gokhale et al. (∞ΩΩΩ) attempted to emulate the manner in which a some-
what sophisticated household might use the program. After soliciting cur-
rent spending levels, QFP asks the user whether he or she wishes to spend
the same amount in the future. We assume that most households would, at
least initially, answer this question in the affirmative. Using information on
income and net worth, the program then determines whether desired ex-
penditures are feasible. If planned spending is not feasible, the user must
adjust planned expenditures downward. If planned spending is feasible, the
user can choose to adjust planned expenditures upward. A sophisticated
household could follow this procedure iteratively until it determined the
highest feasible level of consumption, though this manual process of ‘‘trial
and error’’ is time consuming. Consequently, it is unlikely that even sophisti-
cated households would further fine tune their expenditure plans to accom-
modate changes in household composition (such as the arrival and depar-
ture of children from the household), borrowing constraints, or other
factors that our model handles automatically.
Case A: A Young, Low Income Couple
For this case we assume that both spouses are ≥∑ years old in ∞ΩΩΩ and both
retire at age ∏∑. They plan to have two children, one in ≤≠≠∞ and one in
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≤≠≠≥. The husband earns $∂≥,≠≠≠ initially, declining by ≤≠≠∞ to $≥∑,≠≠≠ and
staying constant in real terms thereafter. The wife earns $≥π,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ,
zero in ≤≠≠≠, $≥∑,≠≠≠ in ≤≠≠∞, $≥∏,≠≠≠ in ≤≠≠≤, $≥π,≠≠≠ in ≤≠≠≥, and $≥∫,≠≠≠
thereafter. The husband receives a gift from his father of $∞≠,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ
and ≤≠≠≠ (in current dollars). Special expenditures include truck loan pay-
ments of $∂,∑≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ and ≤≠≠≠. The couple also plan to spend $≤≠,≠≠≠ on
college tuition for each child between the ages ∞Ω and ≤≤. The couple
allocate $∑,≠≠≠ for each spouse’s funeral, but do not wish to leave incremen-
tal bequests over and above the level necessary to assure survivors of an
undiminished living standard. The couple’s current assets include $∞∂,≠≠≠
in taxable accounts as well as $≥,≠≠≠ in an IRA under the wife’s name. The
wife intends to contribute $∞,≤≠≠ to her IRA annually until she retires. She
will begin withdrawing funds from her IRA at age ∏∑ in equal annual install-
ments. The couple purchases a house in ∞ΩΩΩ for $∞∑≠,≠≠≠, making a down
payment of $∞∑,≠≠≠ and taking out a $∞≥∑,≠≠≠, ≥≠-year mortgage. Monthly
mortgage payments total $ΩΩ≠ including principal and interest. Annual
housing expenses include $≤,∑≠≠ in property taxes, $∂≠≠ in homeowner’s
insurance payments, and $≤,≠≠≠ in maintenance. Both spouses will begin
collecting social security retirement benefits at age ∏∑. All calculations pre-
sented incorporate ESPlanner’s default assumptions concerning economic
parameters, including a ∏ percent nominal interest rate on taxable and
nontaxable assets, a ≥ percent inflation rate, and a nonnegativity constraint
on nonhousing wealth (equivalently, no unsecured borrowing).
If the couple follows ESPlanner’s recommendations, Table π shows it will
never encounter liquidity constraints nor will it ever accumulate a signifi-
cant stock of taxable assets. The couple is advised to consume $≤∏,∫∏∏ ini-
tially, and $≥∫,∑≠≠ when both children are present. QFP, on the other hand,
recommends constant consumption of $≤∏,Ω≤≠ as long as both spouses are
living, irrespective of whether children are present. We would propose that
our model’s recommendation is more reasonable since spending and saving
decisions account for the costs of childrearing. Both programs indicate that
husband and wife should have similar life insurance holdings, reflecting
their similar economic contributions to the household. Nevertheless ESP
recommends significantly less life insurance than QFP.
Case B: A Middle-Aged, Upper Income Couple
For this case, we assume that the wife is ∂≠ years old and the husband ≥Ω, in
∞ΩΩΩ. The couple reside in Massachusetts with two children, one born in
∞ΩΩ∞ and the other ∞ΩΩ≥. The wife does not work, while the husband earns
$≤≠≠,≠≠≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ and ≤≠≠≠. Starting in ≤≠≠∞ and continuing until his retire-
ment at age ∑∑, the husband expects to earn $∞≠≠,≠≠≠. They plan to send
each of their children to college for four years at a cost of $≥≠,≠≠≠ per
child per year. They allocate $∑,≠≠≠ for each spouse’s funeral, but they do
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not wish to leave incremental bequests above the level necessary to assure
survivors of an undiminished living standard. The couple’s taxable assets
are $≤≤∑,∑≠≠. The wife has an IRA with a ∞ΩΩΩ balance of $∫∂,π≠≠, and the
husband has a ∂≠∞(k) with a ∞ΩΩΩ balance of $∞∂∫,≠≠≠. Both plan to with-
draw their nontaxable assets (thereby making them subsequently taxable) at
age ∑Ω. The couple currently saves $∞∞,π∏∑ per year in taxable forms. The
husband plans to contribute $Ω,∑≠≠ to his ∂≠∞(k) plan each year and expects
his employer to contribute $∏,≠≠≠. The wife does not intend to make addi-
tional IRA contributions. The couple owns a $∂π∑,≠≠≠ house with annual
property taxes of $∑,≤≠≠, annual maintenance of $∞,∑≠≠, and annual home-
owner’s insurance of $∑≠≠. They have ≤Ω years remaining on a ≥≠-year mort-
gage; their current mortgage balance stands at $∞π≠,≠≠≠ and they pay
$∞,∞≥∞ per month. Each spouse intends to begin receiving his/her social
security retirement benefits at age ∏≤.
QFP’s and ESPlanner’s recommendations for consumption, taxable sav-
ing, and life insurance differ dramatically, as is clear from Table π. For
example, QFP recommends more than twice as much insurance on the
husband’s life, and this is traceable to several factors. First, ESPlanner rec-
omments that spending should decline sharplyw hen the children leave the
household, so initial consumption (with children present) exceeds that
recommended by QFP. Second, ESPlanner’s estimate of the couple’s short-
term tax liabilities is significantly higher than QFP’s, due to our treatment of
Massachusetts income taxes, which impose high rates on capital income.
Third, QFP does not allow the employer’s matching ∂≠∞(k) contribution to
rise with inflation-induced increases in pay, while our model does. Finally,
QFP’s social security benefit estimates are lower than ours.
Case C: An Older, High Income Couple
In this case, the husband is ∏∂ years old, the wife is ∑π, and the husband
intends to work for two more years, earning close to $∂≠≠,≠≠≠ over this
period. The couple have a variety of large special expenses in the short run,
including an expensive home renovation. The husband has two pensions
providing almost $≤≠≠,≠≠≠ (nominal) annually; he expects to begin receiv-
ing this income as soon as he retires. The couple each allocates $∑,≠≠≠ in
funeral expenses, and the couple also wants to provide gifts or bequests for
the children totaling $≤ million as of ≤≠≤∑. The couple’s taxable net worth is
close to $≥ million. The wife has a small IRA account, and the husband has a
∂≠∞(k) account worth close to three-quarters of a million dollars. Each
spouse elects to withdraw the smallest amount of funds permitted by law
from these tax-favored accounts. The couple own a house with a market
value of $∞.≤ million; annual property taxes, maintenance, and home-
owner’s insurance total $∏,≠≠≠, $∞≥,≠≠≠, and $∞,≠≠≠, respectively. They have
≤∑ years remaining on a ≥≠-year mortgage; their current mortage balance is
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$∑≤∑,≠≠≠, and they pay $≥,≥∞∫ per month. The couple plans to sell its home
in ≤≠≤∑ and thereafter rent a home for $∂,≠≠≠ per month.
Neither model prescribes life insurance for either spouse in this case, but
recommendations for consumption and saving diverge considerably. Ac-
cording to our software, the household can spend $≤≠∂,∑∞≠ in ∞ΩΩΩ (on
items other than housing, taxes, life insurance premiums, and special ex-
penditures), whereas QFP indicates that it should spend no more than
$∞∫∏,∫∫≠. This discrepancy is mainly attributable to the treatment of taxes:
ESPlanner’s estimate of the couple’s ∞ΩΩΩ tax liabilities is $∞∫≤,∂∂Ω, whereas
QFP’s estimate is $≤≥π,∏∫∞. This ≥≠ percent difference is apparently attribut-
able to the deductibility of certain special expenditures which ESPlanner
recognizes, while QFP does not. ESPlanner’s estimate of the couple’s tax
liabilities actually exceeds QFP’s by the time the husband reaches age π∑,
but then it falls below QFP’s. Due in part to the presence of very large, short-
term special expenditures on home remodeling not captured by QFP, ES-
Planner recommends that the couple dissave $≥∞π,∏∞∑ in ∞ΩΩΩ. In contrast,
QFP recommends that the couple dissave only $∞≥∫,≥∫≠.
Implications
As these results demonstrate, it is extremely difficult to achieve consump-
tion smoothing with traditional financial planning tools, even when one
uses these tools in a relatively sophisticated way. Households that rely on
these tools could easily experience significant, predictable, unintended,
and avoidable changes in living standards over the course of their lives. We
must also underscore the importance of accurate financial planning. Eco-
nomic research indicates that people are able to change their financial
decision making in response to information and guidance, particularly
when provided through employers.∏
How Much Should Americans Save as They Approach
Retirement?7
Over the next two decades, a significant fraction of Americans belonging to
the π∑-million-member baby boom generation will reach retirement age.
Impending retirement magnifies the importance of saving, particularly for
those who are currently over age ∑≠. Moreover, in planning for retirement,
boomers must recognize the possibility that fiscal pressures may eventually
force cuts in social security benefits. Short-term surpluses notwithstanding,
the social security system is seriously underfunded. That is, benefits may
have to be cut to ensure system solvency within baby boomers’ lifetimes.
To understand how this may influence baby boomer needs for retirement
saving, Bernheim et al. (≤≠≠≠) apply the ESPlanner model to a sample of
individuals drawn from the Health and Retirement Study. Recommended
An Economic Approach to Retirement Saving Goals 97
levels of saving are contrasted under two alternative policies. In the first, a
‘‘base case’’ scenario Congress avoids reductions in social security benefits.
In the second, ‘‘fiscal distress’’ scenario, Congress is forced to reduce bene-
fits by ≥≠ percent in ≤≠∞∑.
The Health and Retirement Study (HRS) Sample
The ∞ΩΩ≤ wave of the Health and Retirement Study (HRS) collected infor-
mation on a nationally representative sample of Americans age ∑∞–∏∞ and
their spouses of any age. The survey contains a great deal of economic and
demographic data, and additional information required by ESPlanner is
imputed following Bernheim et al. (∞ΩΩΩ). The analysis is restricted to
households satisfying the following criteria: (∞) the head’s age was between
∑∞ and ∏∞ in ∞ΩΩ≤; (≤) information on social security earnings in past cov-
ered employment is available for both the head and the spouse (if any); and
(≥) the respondent answered all critical survey questions. We excluded an
additional ∞∂∞ because their economic resources were insufficient to cover
their housing costs and other off-the-top expenditures. Our analysis consists
of ∞,π∞∂ married couples and ∞,∞∂∑ single individuals.
Recommended Saving Rates
Our median recommended saving patterns for HRS households appear in
Table ∫. The saving rate is defined as non-tax-favored saving divided by
income; we note that this measure of saving excludes contributions to, or
withdrawals from, retirement accounts. Our measure of income also ex-
cludes net contributions to tax-favored accounts. We sort heads into two age
groups—∑≠–∑∑ and ∑∏–∏∞—and then further stratify the sample based on
household income, marital status, race, and education. We present results
for both social security policy scenarios. Our calculations assume a ∏ percent
nominal interest rate and a ≥ percent inflation rate.
Consider first the base case policy scenario which involves no social se-
curity benefit cuts. If we focus for the moment on Panel A, for the ∑≠ to ∑∑
year-old age group, we note that the median recommended saving rate for
those with incomes below $∞∑,≠≠≠ is very small—only one percent. For
those with incomes over $∞≠≠,≠≠≠, the median recommended saving rate is
fairly high, ∞π percent. For middle income households, those with incomes
between $∞∑,≠≠≠ and $∂∑,≠≠≠, and those with incomes between $∂∑,≠≠≠ and
$∞≠≠,≠≠≠, the median recommended saving rates are ∞≥ and ∞∂ percent
respectively. The strong positive relation between recommended saving
rates and income is, in large part, attributable to the progressive structure of
the social security benefit formula, which provides lower income individuals
with significantly higher rates of earnings replacement. In the older subsam-
ple (ages ∑∏–∏∞), we find again that median recommended saving rates
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increase sharply with income. With the exception of the lowest income
group, these rates also rise steeply with age; they range from ∞π percent for
older households with incomes of $∞∑,≠≠≠–$∂∑,≠≠≠, to ≤≥ percent for older
households with incomes over $∞≠≠,≠≠≠.
To some extent, households can achieve these saving rate targets by rein-
vesting income earned from previously accumulated assets. It is therefore
natural to wonder whether reinvested capital income is sufficient to reach
the targets, or whether households must also put away significant fractions
of take-home pay. To examine this issue, we calculate recommended rates of
saving for non-asset income. Specifically, we adjusted the recommended sav-
ing rates by subtracting non-tax-favored capital income from both the nu-
merator and the denominator of the ratio. For the lowest and second lowest
income segments of both age groups, median recommended saving rates
are essentially unchanged. For households with incomes from $∂∑,≠≠≠–
$∞≠≠,≠≠≠, the adjustment reduces the median recommended saving rate
among younger households from ∞≥ percent to ∞≤ percent, and leaves the
median recommended saving rate among older households unchanged at
∞π percent. Hence, our model indicates that most older households do
need to save significant fractions of non-asset income.
Rcommended saving rates tend to be higher for single individuals, non-
whites, and those without college education. For example, among non-
white households aged ∑∏–∏∞ with incomes of $∞∑,≠≠≠–$∂∑,≠≠≠, the me-
dian recommended saving rate is ≤≥ percent. This is six percentage points
higher than the corresponding rate for whites and nonwhites combined.
Likewise, in the same age and income group, the median recommended
saving rate is ≤≥ for single households, compared with ∞∂ percent for mar-
ried couples. Though these systematic differences are important, we note
that they also mask considerable variation within groups.
The impact of potential social security benefit cuts. We have also completed
recommended saving rates for the second ‘‘fiscal distress’’ policy scenario,
in which social security benefits are cut by ≥≠ percent as of ≤≠∞∑. The results
in Table ∫ differ dramatically from those of the base case scenario. Consider,
for example, married households in the lowest income category. The me-
dian recommended rate of saving rises by ∞≠ percentage points for the
younger age group, and by ∞≤ points for the older group. In the second low-
est income group, recommended saving rates rise by eight and seven per-
centage points, respectively, for the younger and older age groups. Among
high income households, the increases are smaller but still important. Rec-
ommended rates of saving out of non-asset income also rise sharply; for the
middle income groups, these rates range from ∞∏ to ≤≤ percent.
Alternative assumptions: lifespan, market performance, retirement, and nursing
home care. Table Ω explores the sensitivity of results to several alternative
assumptions.∫ First, we recalculate recommended saving rates assuming a
maximum lifespan (for both the respondent and the spouse) of ∞≠≠, rather
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Table 9. Median Recommended Non-Tax-Favored Saving Rates with Alternative
Assumptions (Ration of Non-Tax-Favored Saving to Income by Income
and Demographic Group)
Annual Income
$≠–$∞∑,≠≠≠
$∞∑,≠≠≠–
$∂∑,≠≠≠
$∂∑,≠≠≠–
$∞≠≠,≠≠≠
Over
$∞≠≠,≠≠≠
Married Age ∑≠–∑∑
Base Case .≠≠ .≠Ω .∞∂ .∞π
Fiscal Distress .∞≠ .∞π .∞Ω .≤≠
Max. Age = ∞≠≠ .≠∞ .∞≠ .∞∑ .∞Ω
Assets Drop ≥≠% .≠∞ .∞≠ .∞∑ .≤≠
Ret. ≤ Yrs Early –.≠∞ .∞∂ .∞π .∞Ω
Nursing Home .≤≠ .∞∫ .∞∫ .≤≠
All of the Above .≥Ω .≥≤ .≤Ω .≤Ω
Married Age ∑∏–∏∞
Base Case –.∞∞ .∞∂ .≤≠ .≤≥
Fiscal Distress .≠∞ .≤∞ .≤∑ .≤∑
Max. Age = ∞≠≠ –.≠Ω .∞∏ .≤∞ .≤∂
Assets Drop ≥≠% –.≠Ω .∞∂ .≤≤ .≤∂
Ret. ≤ Yrs Early –.∞≤ .∞∑ .∞Ω .≤≥
Nursing Home .∞Ω .≤∑ .≤∑ .≤∑
All of the above .≥∞ .≥∑ .≥≤ .≥≤
Single Age ∑≠–∑∑
Base Case .≠∞ .∞π .≤≠ .≤∫
Fiscal Distress .≠∑ .≤∂ .≤∂ .≤Ω
Max. Age = ∞≠≠ .≠≥ .∞∫ .≤∞ .≥≠
Assets Drop ≥≠% .≠∞ .∞Ω .≤∞ .≥≤
Ret. ≤ Yrs Early .≠≥ .≤≥ .≤∂ .≥∞
Nursing Home .∞Ω .≤≥ .≤≥ .≤Ω
All of the Above .≥∞ .≥∏ .≥≤ .≥Ω
Single Age ∑∏–∏∞
Base Case .≠≤ .≤≥ .≤≥ .∞Ω
Fiscal Distress .≠≥ .≤∫ .≤∏ .≤≠
Max. Age = ∞≠≠ .≠π .≤∂ .≤∂ .≤∞
Assets Drop ≥≠% .≠≤ .≤∂ .≤π .≥∞
Ret. ≤ Yrs Early .≠≠ .≤≥ .≤≥ .≤≤
Nursing Home .≥≤ .≤Ω .≤∏ .≤≠
All of the Above .≥≥ .≥π .≥≥ .≥Ω
Source: Authors’ calculations based on HRS (∞ΩΩ≤).
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than Ω∑. Second, we assume that there is an immediate ≥≠ percent decline in
the market value of stocks and other financial assets, after which these assets
earn the same return as in our base case. Third, for each household, we
accelerate retirement by two years. Fourth, we assume that respondents and
spouses must each accumulate a reserve fund sufficient to defray the costs of
nursing home care at $∞∑,≠≠≠ per year for five years (in current dollars). We
recognize that the cost of nursing home care may exceed $∞∑,≠≠≠ per year;
however, other spending presumably declines when an individual is institu-
tionalized, so the $∞∑,≠≠≠ figure is intended to represent the net increment
to total expenditures. Finally, we consider the combined effects of all of
these assumptions, along with the fiscal distress scenario examined pre-
viously.Ω For purposes of comparison, Table Ω also summarizes findings for
the base case and fiscal distress scenarios, where the latter requires a social
security benefit cut.
The evidence reveals that the fourth assumption, saving for nursing home
care, has the largest impact on recommended saving rates. It is particularly
important for those with the lowest levels of income, raising recommended
median saving rates by ∞∫ to ≥≠ percentage points. These figures may be
somewhat exaggerated, in that low income families are more inclined to rely
on Medicaid, even though this tends to reduce the quality of care received.
Nevertheless, our results suggest more generally that low income families
may need to save at high rates if they wish to establish nontrivial emergency
funds. Increasing the maximum lifespan from Ω∑ to ∞≠≠ years has a more
modest effect on median recommended saving rates, which generally rise by
∞ to ≤ percentage points, with the exception of older, low income, single
individuals, for whom the increase is ∑ percentage points. A ≥≠ percent
decline in asset values also has a relatively small effect on recommended
savings rates, except among high-income households. Finally, accelerating
retirement by two years has a sizable impact on recommendations for par-
ticular subgroups. For example, the median recommended saving rate rises
by five percentage points for married couples between the ages of ∑≠ and ∑∑,
with incomes between $∞∑,≠≠≠ and $∂∑,≠≠≠. In some groups, recommended
saving stays constant or declines. This occurs because the acceleration of
retirement renders some households unable to cover housing expenses and
other off-the-top commitments.
When we consider the combined effects of all four assumptions, along
with the benefit cut scenario, recommended median saving rates rise dra-
matically for all subgroups, from ≥≠ to ∂≠ percent. For example, among the
lowest income married couples, the median recommended saving rate in-
creases from zero to ≥Ω percent. Moreover, the numbr of households with
infeasible planning problems (that is, those who can no longer cover off-the-
top expenditures) rises from ∞∂∞ to ≥∂∏. This statistic sheds additional
light on the degree of undersaving and financial vulnerability among HRS
households.
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Comparisons with Prior Studies
Previous studies have explored the adequacy of saving patterns using dif-
ferent data and/or alternative methodologies.∞≠
Kotlikoff et al. (∞Ω∫≥) compare the level of consumption that a household
could have sustained over its entire lifetime given its total resources, with the
level of consumption that it can sustain over its remaining lifetime given its
remaining resources. Absent Social Security, they conclude that a significant
fraction of the elderly will suffer a decline in living standard during old
age. Actual asset profiles among baby boomers are compared with recom-
mended asset profiles generated by a stylized life cycle model by Bernheim
(∞ΩΩ∂), and there typical baby boomers are found to be saving only one-
third of what is required to maintain living standards. Bernheim and Scholz
(∞ΩΩ≥) compare changes in wealth and asset profiles with the predictions of
a life cycle model, and they find evidence of inadequate saving among indi-
viduals without college education. Warshawsky and Ameriks (≤≠≠≠) use
Quicken Financial Planner to assess saving adequacy, concluding that more
than half of the households examined would run out of money prematurely
if they tried to maintain the living standards that they enjoyed in ∞ΩΩ≤.
A paper closely related to the resent analysis Moore and Mitchell (≤≠≠≠),
which calculates saving needed to maintain preretirement living standards
for a sample of HRS households. Their methodology differs from ours in
that they assume that people treat housing as a fungible store of wealth,
whereas we assume that older individuals retain their homes until death.
The available evidence is sparse but favors the latter assumption: thus Venti
and Wise (this volume) conclude that ‘‘very little reduction in home eq-
uity . . . can be construed as converting home equity to liquid assets for
purposes of supporting non-housing consumption.’’ Likewise, Caplin (this
volume) finds that few individuals use reverse mortgages to convert housing
equity into income streams for the purpose of supporting consumption
expenditure. Despite this difference (and others), Moore and Mitchell’s
principal finding—that the median HRS household needs to save ∞∏ per-
cent more of its income to preserve its living standard—is consistent with
our results.
Conclusions and Discussion
Traditional financial planning models are based on targeted saving. This
approach requires a household to choose future spending or income levels,
and then to save to meet associated targets. Since setting an appropriate
target is a highly complex problem, households are often encouraged to
rely on rough rules of thumb, even though this may not produce a smooth
and sustainable living standard. Our alternative method of financial plan-
ning is rooted in economic theory and does not require households to
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undertake complex aspects of planning by themselves. Instead, our software
derives a saving target for each household by determining its highest sus-
tainable living standard, as well as the levels of saving and life insurance
needed to preserve that living standard.
It is interesting that this economic approach to financial planning, em-
bodied in our ESPlanner package, generates different recommendations
from the traditional approach (typified by Quicken Financial Planner).
Although the differences in saving recommendations are large, they are not
systematically high or low. For some households, the traditional model rec-
ommends far too little saving compared with our model; for others, it recom-
mends far too much. Differences in life insurance recommendations are also
typically large, but they tend to be more systematic, with the traditional
approach generally overstating life insurance requirements. Applying our
model to a sample of several thousand households, we find that most older
Americans approaching retirement need to save at quite high rates—rates
that are much higher than those commonly observed. Our conclusion is
strengthened once we account for potential cuts in social security benefits,
gains in longevity, stock market declines, and the costs of nursing home care.
Notes
We are grateful to the National Institute of Aging for research support and to
Economic Security Planning, Inc. for permitting the use of Economic Security Plan-
ner (ESPlanner) in this study. Opinions expressed in this paper are solely those of
the authors.
∞. The developers of the ESPlanner software package are Douglas Bernheim,
Jagadeesh Gokhale, Laurence Kotlikoff, and Lowell Williams and the product is
available through Economic Security Planning, Inc. at MIT Press. For additional
information see »www.esplanner.com…. This paper draws on and extends Gokhale et
al. (∞ΩΩΩ) and Bernheim et al. (≤≠≠≠).
≤. To speed data entry, users may elect a default that sets the contingent earnings
path equal to the joint-survivor path. Users may specify future income in either
present-year (real) dollars, or future-year (nominal) dollars.
≥. To speed data entry, users may elect a default that sets the contingent expendi-
tures and receipts equal to the joint-survivor values. Users may specify future expen-
ditures and receipts in either present-year (real) dollars, or future-year (nominal)
dollars.
∂. Negative life insurance is formally identical to the purchase of an inverted life
annuity, that is, the receipt of annual payments for life purchased by the estate of the
deceased in a predetermined lump sum amount.
∑. ESPlanner produces several main reports including current recommendations,
annual recommendations, non-tax-favored balance sheet, income, spending, non-
asset income (for each spouse), housing, taxes, tax-favored balance sheets (for each
spouse), estate reports (for each spouse and for couples if both spouses die in the
same year), social security benefit reports (for the household and for each spouse).
ESPlanner’s survivor reports are essentially the same as the main reports.
∏. See Bernheim and Garrett (∞ΩΩΩ); Bayer, Bernheim, and Scholz (∞ΩΩ∏); Bern-
heim (∞ΩΩ∫); and Clark and Schieber (∞ΩΩ∫).
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π. This section draws and extends on Bernheim et al. (≤≠≠≠).
∫. Qualitatively similar conclusions follow for plausible alternative values of the key
economic parameters. For example, with an ∫ percent nominal (∑ percent real) rate
of return, the median recommended saving rates for ∑≠–∑∑-year-olds are respectively
∞, ∞∞, ∞∞, and ∞≠ percent for the first through fourth income categories. The corre-
sponding figures from Table ∫ are ∞, ∞≥, ∞∂, and ∞π percent. For ∑∏–∏∞-year-olds,
median recommended saving rates with the higher rate of return are respectively ∞,
∞∏, ∞π, and ≤≠ percent for the first through fourth income categories. The compara-
ble figures from Table ∫ are ≠, ∞π, ≤≠, and ≤≥ percent. Thus, recommended saving
rates are lower with the higher interest rate. However, recommendations are still
highly sensitive to assumptions about social security benefits. For our second policy
scenario, median recommended saving rates among ∑∏–∏∞-year-olds are respectively
∂, ∞π, ∞∏, and ∞≤ percent for the first through fourth income categories, assuming a
nominal return of ∫ percent. Among ∑≠ to ∑∑ year olds, the comparable figures are ≥,
≤∞, ≤∞, and ≤≤ percent. Each of these rates is significantly higher than the corre-
sponding figure for the base case policy scenario.
Ω. Another important possibility is that tax rates may rise in the future, particularly
if the social security system runs into fiscal problems. This consideration would
magnify the need for saving, thereby reinforcing our conclusions.
∞≠. Some research disputes the view that U.S. households tend to save too little.
For instance, Manchester (∞ΩΩ∂) concluded that members of the baby boom genera-
tion accumulated wealth more rapidly than did their parents, while Hubbard et al.
(∞ΩΩ∂) argue that low saving may be optimal for many low income households, in
that saving may adversely affect eligibility for Medicaid and other income-support
programs. Engen et al. (∞ΩΩΩ) point out that apparent instances of low saving some-
times result from transitory periods of low income. They also claim that the age
trajectory of median net worth matches or exceeds the predictions of a stylized life
cycle model.
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